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ESSAY 
REFRAMING THE CONFIRMATION DEBATE 
ADAM FELDMAN† 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court is home to nine Justices. Over the past one hundred 
and fifty years, there has been no variation in this number, except due to 
vacancies caused by death or retirement. Therefore, people have had little 
reason to believe that there is any flexibility in this arrangement. But nothing 
in the Constitution fixes the Supreme Court at this size. In fact, the size was 
set to seven Justices in 1866.1 It was placed at ten in 1863.2 Thus, the number 
of seats can be quite malleable.3 It was not until 1869 that Congress set the 
size to the nine seats that we are accustomed to today.4 
During the recent Supreme Court vacancy—caused by the death of 
Justice Antonin Scalia—and the ensuing unwillingness of the Senate to hold 
confirmation hearings, the issue of the Supreme Court’s size, and the duties 
(if any) of the other branches of the federal government to maintain its size, 
have come under intense scrutiny. The role of partisan politics in the Senate’s 
seemingly intransigent position not to hold confirmation hearings during the 
remainder of President Obama’s presidency exacerbates this public debate. 
This Essay seeks to reframe the current debate from whether or not the 
Senate should be obligated to hold confirmation hearings without delay to why 
immediate confirmation hearings are so important for some and such an 
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1 Judicial Circuits Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 209. 
2 Tenth Circuit Act of 1863, 12 Stat. 794. 
3 See generally, e.g., William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Court-Packing” 
Plan, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 347 (detailing the history behind President Roosevelt’s efforts to increase 
the size of the Supreme Court beyond nine Justices). 
4 Circuit Judges Act of 1869, 16 Stat. 44. 
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anathema to others. It does so by looking at how a Supreme Court of nine helps 
the Court fulfill its constitutional duties while also considering how nine 
Justices may actually thwart the Court’s objectives. This Essay proceeds by 
examining how ideological polarization among the Justices, and not the 
Court’s size, is the source of current (and past) tension. It also examines how 
the orientation and effect of the current polarization are antithetical to a 
well–functioning Supreme Court.  
I. WHY NINE? 
Article III of the United States Constitution vests the judicial power “in 
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from 
time to time ordain and establish.”5 It also lays the groundwork for the 
situations that warrant federal court review.6 The Constitution, however, says 
nothing about the goals of Supreme Court adjudication. 
To locate the foundation undergirding these goals in early American history, 
we can turn to Federalist Number 78. There, Alexander Hamilton explained: 
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. 
A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges as, a fundamental 
law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning 
of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body.7 
The Court’s role in constitutional and statutory interpretation was of such 
importance to the Framers that they introduced specific safeguards into 
federal judgeships, such as life tenure and a guaranteed salary,8 to assure that 
the Justices’ decisions would not easily be swayed by extrinsic forces. 
Accordingly, Hamilton wrote: 
That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the Constitution, and 
of individuals, which we perceive to be indispensable in the courts of justice, 
can certainly not be expected from judges who hold their offices by a 
temporary commission.9 
From these statements and not from the Constitution itself, the original 
purpose behind the Supreme Court is set forth: maintaining the letter of the 
law in accordance with the Constitution. 
 
5 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
6 See id. § 2 (providing the cases and controversies to which “[t]he judicial Power shall extend”). 
7 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
8 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing that federal judges “shall hold their Offices during 
good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall 
not be diminished during their Continuance in Office”). 
9 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 470-71 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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The goal of the Court is also conveyed in some of its most well-known 
cases.10 Some of these historic precedents were laid down by non-nine-member 
Courts. The Marshall Court that decided Marbury v. Madison, for instance, 
was composed of only six Justices.11 
The public dilemma regarding the size of the Court was not present in the 
nation’s early history. Part of the reason for this had to do with the size of the 
Court evolving with the country’s needs—the size of the early Supreme Court 
mimicked the number of geographic judicial circuits, so that each circuit would 
have its own judicial representatives.12 Intra–Court ideological friction had yet 
to insinuate itself into the public discourse surrounding the Court, and the rule 
of law was at least publicly seen as the guidepost of jurisprudence.13 Whether 
this was an accurate precept or not, there was little to challenge the sensibility 
that the decisions of the Supreme Court were steeped predominately in legal 
interpretation. But ideology soon became associated with legal 
decisionmaking. Professor Llewellyn, for instance, observed that the ideology 
of capitalism dictated American law in the early twentieth century.14 Not long 
after, C. Herman Pritchett differentiated Supreme Court Justices’ preferences 
along the liberal–conservative ideological continuum.15 
The key point identified by judicial scholars—even by the mid-twentieth 
century—was that Supreme Court Justices’ views accorded with those of the 
political elites.16 Scholars realized that appointing Presidents and incumbent 
Congresses had strong influences on Supreme Court Justices’ decisionmaking.17 
 
10 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”); see also United States v. Nixon, 
418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974) (noting that “[m]any decisions of [the] Court . . . have unequivocally 
reaffirmed the holding of Marbury . . . that ‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is’” (fifth alteration in original)). 
11 The members of this Court included Chief Justice Marshall and Justices Cushing, Paterson, 
Chase, Washington, and Moore. 
12 See Sandra Day O’Connor, Foreword, The Changing Role of the Circuit Justice, 17 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 521, 521-23 (1986) (detailing the history of Supreme Court Justices riding circuit). 
13 Roscoe Pound, Theories of Law, 22 YALE L.J. 114, 126 (1912) (“[T]he obligation of a rule of 
law and the obligation of a moral rule, in this view, are essentially the same. In each case there is an 
obligation resting upon reason, in that reason shows us the dictates of right and justice.”). 
14 See K.N. Llewellyn, On Philosophy in American Law, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 205, 207-08 (1934) 
(arguing that “the Business Man took hold of the ideology of America,” and it was this ideology that 
“underlay the private law between 1870 and, say, 1900”). 
15 See generally C. Herman Pritchett, Justice Holmes and a Liberal Court, 24 VA. Q. REV. 43 (1948). 
16 See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National 
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 294 (1957) (describing how the views of the Supreme Court Justices 
almost always align with those of the “dominant [national] alliance”). 
17 See Lee Epstein & Eric A. Posner, Supreme Court Justices’ Loyalty to the President 26 (December 
10, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2702144 [https://perma.cc/6V9Y-JKHR] 
(concluding that “Justices are more like[ly] to vote in favor of the government of the president who appointed 
them than later governments, even after controlling for ideological and other relevant factors”). 
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Although the Supreme Court might have survived with an even number 
of Justices if the Justices were not clearly politically motivated, an even 
number of Justices is not tenable on a Court influenced by political 
preferences.18 How could the Supreme Court come to any conclusion on 
impactful, substantive issues when the Justices are evenly divided between 
political viewpoints? 
II. PROBLEMS WITH EIGHT, PROBLEMS WITH NINE 
Was the solution to a divided Court an odd number of Justices? Although 
Supreme Court Justices have policy preferences, they are not so obtuse as to 
flout them in the public domain. Strategic judicial theory helps to fill this 
void by providing an explanation for how preferences balance out with tactical 
decisionmaking.19 
While an odd number of Justices puts a clear stopgap on indecision, it also 
puts a premium on the tie-breaking vote. Although decisive outcomes became 
inevitable with an odd number of Justices, the power of the tie-breaking vote 
did not immediately become an object of inquiry. The idea of the median 
Justice as a powerful member of the Court became a focal topic of discussion 
many years after the decision to set the Supreme Court’s size at nine 
Justices.20 Although a Court evenly divided across the ideological spectrum 
creates an obvious concern of stalemates, an odd number of Justices will not 
detract from the effect of ideology on the Justices’ decisions and may merely 
enhance the median Justice’s power (which does not exist on an eight-member 
Court) to decide cases based on ideological preferences. 
There is vast power in a tie-breaking vote, especially when the vote favors 
one political direction or the other. A balance of Justices on the liberal side of 
the ideological spectrum helped the Warren Court to reach groundbreaking 
decisions, from deconstructing the doctrine of separate but equal,21 to 
providing increased procedural rights to the criminally accused.22 The shift 
 
18 Cf. Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science 
Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1186 (2004) 
(describing “the Court’s often confounding ideological equipoise on many issues”). 
19 See Samuel Krislov, Theoretical Attempts at Predicting Judicial Behavior, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 
1577-78 (1966) (describing the application of game theoretic models to the study of judicial behavior 
to better understand the judicial bargaining process). 
20 See Glendon Schubert, Judicial Attitudes and Voting Behavior: The 1961 Term of the United States 
Supreme Court, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., WINTER 1963, at 100, 140 (1963) (factoring the 
median Justice into decision-related calculations). 
21 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that “[s]eparate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal”). 
22 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding, 5–4, that “the prosecution 
[in a criminal case] may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from 
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in the Court’s ideological and partisan balance under Chief Justice Burger and 
later under Chief Justices Rehnquist and Roberts led to retreats from the 
doctrines laid down by the Warren Court.23 
From the Warren Court on, the perceived political preferences of the 
Justices highly correlated with their voting patterns.24 The ideological median 
of the Court became identified as the Justice with the most decisionmaking 
power.25 With all of the rhetoric and scholarship that has tracked the political 
balance of the Court over the past half-century or more, there is a general 
silence about its role in the current confirmation crisis. 
With an even number of Justices, divided along the ideological spectrum, 
the Court has been unable to decide on three of the most controversial cases 
of the 2015 Supreme Court Term. In a sense, the Court has been unable to 
fulfill its duty to interpret the Constitution and clarify the law according to 
constitutional strictures for the rest of the country. 
In Zubik v. Burwell, the Court was asked to review challenges to the 
Affordable Care Act, based on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.26 
Even with a prior ruling upholding corporate religious rights to bypass 
certain healthcare guarantees under the Act in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores27—which was decided when Justice Scalia was still alive, a Court 
composed of eight Justices in Zubik was unable to reach a decision and instead 
remanded the case to the lower courts for further review.28 
In a second case with implications for a large swath of the country’s 
population, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, the Court divided evenly on 
the question of whether non-union employees could opt out of paying public 
union dues if they are based on agency shop arrangements.29 The Court, with 
only eight Justices, again failed to reach a conclusion. 
Finally, in a third case with far-reaching implications, the Justices were 
evenly deadlocked on reaching a decision in United States v. Texas.30 As a result 
 
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards 
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination”). 
23 See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-25 (1984) (establishing a good faith 
exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule). 
24 See Epstein & Posner, supra note 17, at 2 (noting that “numerous studies have established 
that Supreme Court justices engage in ideological voting”). 
25 See Robert Barnes, Justice Kennedy: The Highly Influential Man in the Middle, WASH. POST (May 
13, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/12/AR2007051201586.html 
[https://perma.cc/DN45-DSS3] (noting that “[b]ecause the court so far has shown itself to be strikingly—and 
evenly—divided on ideological issues, Kennedy holds enormous power in pivoting between the left and 
right . . . . He stands alone in the middle—and that enhances his importance.”). 
26 135 S. Ct. 1557, 1559 (2016) (per curiam). 
27 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
28 Zubik, 135 S. Ct. at 1560. 
29 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (mem.). 
30 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (mem.). 
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of their indecision, the lower court’s opinion denying President Obama’s 
amnesty plan for certain immigrant aliens was upheld.31 In all of these 
decisions, there is no stare decisis laid down for lower courts to follow. While 
it is unlikely that the Court would remand these cases with nine Justices after 
granting certiorari, this is exactly what happened with eight. 
The eight Justices on the Supreme Court without Justice Scalia are not 
only known to split along ideological lines, but their preferences also correlate 
with the political persuasions of their respective appointing Presidents.32 This 
clear division perpetuates the public’s fear that the Justices will be unable to 
reach consensus due to the inherent fragmentation in their voting decisions.33 
This fracture and delay has also catalyzed the oftentimes publicly silent Justices 
into commenting on and criticizing the Senate’s failure to hold confirmation 
hearings for a ninth Justice.34 
On a positive note, in an effort to reach consensus and avoid more 
stalemates on the eight-member Court, the Justices were forced to find points 
of unity that extended beyond their normal voting coalitions. We see this in 
instances such as the shared dissents between the often opposed Justices 
Sotomayor and Thomas. The two Justices dissented as many times together 
during the 2015 Term (four times) as they have in all prior terms where they 
sat on the Court together combined.35 
Still, notwithstanding the benefits of increased collegiality, the eight–member 
Supreme Court has been unable to resolve many cases that would clearly 
benefit from adjudication, as detailed above, due to the Court’s even number 
of Justices. A question thus arises: does the Court require nine Justices to 
prevent these even divisions? By this point it should be clear that any odd 
numbered amalgamation of Justices should overcome judicial stalemates. 
Cases in the lower appellate courts are routinely decided by panels composed 
of three judges.36 Additionally, history has shown that an odd number of 
Justices will lead to decisive outcomes and will help fulfill the Court’s role as 
arbiter of the law according to the Constitution. 
 
31 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 187-88 (5th Cir. 2015), aff ’d by an equally divided court, 
136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
32 See generally Epstein & Posner, supra note 17. 
33 See, e.g., Jess Bravin, Divided Supreme Court Lurches to Term’s End, WALL ST. J. (June 19, 2016), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/divided-supreme-court-lurches-to-terms-end-1466328601 (noting that the 
Court “apparently sees little purpose in taking cases for the next term that might also deadlock”). 
34 See Ariane de Vogue, Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: 8 Is Not a Good Number, 
CNN POLITICS (May 26, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/26/politics/ruth-bader-ginsburg-
eight-justices/ [https://perma.cc/PW5D-L2YT] (quoting Justice Ginsburg saying eight justices “is 
not a good number for a multi-member court”). 
35 Adam Feldman, Odd Couples (and Trios), EMPIRICAL SCOTUS (June 20, 2016), 
https://empiricalscotus.com/2016/06/20/odd-couples/ [https://perma.cc/Y7T3-QXD7]. 
36 See 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1982) (setting the number of circuit judges on a panel at three). 
2016] Reframing the Confirmation Debate 27 
The trouble with an odd-numbered Court is that, while issues are more 
easily resolved in such a setting, they may be resolved according to extra-judicial, 
political factors stemming from the polarization of the Justices’ views. That 
is, Justices can vote based on their political ideology, with the dominant view 
at the time controlling the outcome of the case. Thus, an odd number of 
Justices may create a new predicament while solving another. We are forced 
to decide whether it is better to have a Court with outcomes hinging on 
political motivations, or to leave the divisions in the laws unresolved and 
create variation between federal geographic circuits. 
III. THE SWING JUSTICE’S COURT 
So what is the real impetus behind the conversation about the ensuing but 
stalled confirmation hearings? It is not about the flaws in the political process 
but about the ideological balance of judicial decisionmaking. 
In close decisions, especially those that affect public policy, dissenting 
Justices oftentimes accuse the majority of usurping power from the other 
branches of government. This is apparent in Justice Breyer’s dissent in Bush v. 
Gore, a case that effectively decided the outcome of a Presidential election: 
However awkward or difficult it may be for Congress to resolve difficult 
electoral disputes, Congress, being a political body, expresses the people’s will 
far more accurately than does an unelected Court.37 
It is also evident in Justice Scalia’s dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges, decrying 
the constitutionalization of marriage equality: 
This practice of constitutional revision by an unelected committee of nine, always 
accompanied (as it is today) by extravagant praise of liberty, robs the People of the 
most important liberty they asserted in the Declaration of Independence and won 
in the Revolution of 1776: the freedom to govern themselves.38 
Justices Scalia and Breyer traditionally take positions on opposite ends of 
the ideological spectrum, and yet they sound remarkably similar in their 
separate accounts of a majority of the Court playing policymaker. Both of 
these cases were 5–4 decisions, and both saw the more liberal Justices voting 
together in one direction and the more conservative Justices voting together 
in the other.39 And while the majority opinion author in Bush v. Gore is 
 
37 531 U.S. 98, 155 (2000) (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
38 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2627 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
39 Although Bush v. Gore was an unsigned per curiam opinion, the dissents from the four more 
liberal Justices—Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer—betray who comprised the five Justices in 
the majority. 
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unclear, the swing Justice of the most recent Court, Justice Kennedy, wrote 
the majority opinion in Obergefell. 
In fact, it is Justice Kennedy’s vote that has often dictated whether the 
conservative or liberal position wins out in close cases.40 This places the power 
to define the direction of Supreme Court precedent in Justice Kennedy’s hands, 
especially in some of the most significant and contentious cases.41 
The problem that the Court faces with nine Justices is similar to the 
problem it faces with eight Justices, although the effects are different. When 
Justice Scalia was still a member of the Court, four Justices tended to vote in 
the liberal direction (Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) and 
four tended to vote in the conservative direction (Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito). This created a vacuum of power for the swing 
Justice, Justice Kennedy, to usurp, causing his vote to often be decisive.42  
Justice Kennedy’s ability to shape the Court’s opinions is further 
accentuated by the number of majority opinions he wrote in 5–4 cases 
compared to all other Justices during this period. Majority opinion 
assignment in close cases can be offered in exchange for a vote in a certain 
direction.43 The figure below shows the breakdown, by opinion author, of the 
183 signed 5–4 decisions from 2005–2014. 
 
40 See Richard Wolf, From Gay Marriage to Voting Law, Kennedy Is the Key, USA TODAY (June 27, 2013), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/06/27/supreme-court-anthony-kennedy-race-voting-
abortion-gay-marriage/2161701/ [https://perma.cc/GBN7-GA3Y] (discussing Justice Kennedy’s pivotal 
role in the outcomes of various cases). Justice O’Connor sat on the Court until the 2005 Term. When 
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy sat on the Court together, Justice O’Connor shared the role of swing 
Justice with Justice Kennedy. See Andrew D. Martin et al., The Median Justice on the United States 
Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1308-11 (2005) (describing Justice O’Connor as the most pivotal 
Justice, along with Justice Kennedy). 
41 See Eric Segall, Justice Scalia’s Cruelest Irony: This is the Real Impact of a 4–4 Supreme Court, 
SALON.COM (May 26, 2016), http://www.salon.com/2016/05/28/justice_scalias_cruelest_irony_ 
this_is_the_real_impact_of_a_4_4_supreme_court/ [https://perma.cc/VBE4-9E3M] (noting that, 
from 1988 to 2016, Justice Kennedy was in the majority of roughly 75% of the Court’s 5–4 decisions, 
more than any other Justice). 
42 See id. (noting Justice Kennedy’s decisive role in a number of cases). 
43 Jeffrey R. Lax & Charles M. Cameron, Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 276, 277 (2007) (“If the identity of the [majority] author does matter, 
therefore, it must be because the bargaining protocol used by the Supreme Court confers a degree 
of monopoly power on the opinion writer.”). 
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Justice Kennedy not only wrote more of these decisions than any other 
Justice, but he also wrote almost twice as many as the Justice with the next 
highest count: Justice Alito. This skewed balance of opinion writing in some 
of the Court’s most far–reaching constitutional decisions has deep 
repercussions for how we perceive the Supreme Court’s decisionmaking 
process. When the ideologically polarized Justices are split in these cases, the 
locus of power is, by default, delegated to the Justice in the middle. 
The real implications of the Justices’ positions in highly charged cases is 
evident from those cases where Justice Kennedy’s vote defined the Court’s 
majority voting direction. Take for instance the highly publicized decision in 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.44 In a majority opinion 
supported by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, 
Justice Kennedy harnessed the power of the First Amendment, holding: 
We find no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political speech, 
the Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers. 
Both history and logic lead us to this conclusion.45 
Justice Stevens, dissenting in part and joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, 
and Sotomayor, discussed the gravity of this ruling, stating: 
 
44 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
45 Id. at 341. 
2 7 8 9 10 17
18 20
23 25
44
Number of Majority Opinions in 5–4 
Split Decisions (2005-2014)
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The Court’s ruling threatens to undermine the integrity of elected 
institutions across the Nation. The path it has taken to reach its outcome will, 
I fear, do damage to this institution.46 
This dialogue between Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion and Justice 
Stevens’ dissent illustrates the stakes involved in a case that came down to 
the vote of one Justice.47 
Justice Kennedy’s ability to shift the balance of the Court’s power in the 
other direction is equally evident. In Boumediene v. Bush, Justice Kennedy 
penned the majority opinion, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, 
and Breyer, which allowed detainees held at Guantanamo Bay to seek the writ 
of habeas corpus in federal court.48 In dissent, Justice Scalia, who supported 
Justice Kennedy’s decision in Citizens United, harshly criticized the Court’s 
decision as violative of the separation of powers: 
What competence does the Court have to second-guess the judgment of 
Congress and the President on such a point? None whatever. But the Court 
blunders in nonetheless.49 
These examples emphasize both Justice Kennedy’s decisionmaking power, 
as well as the fact that, depending on how he voted in 5–4 decisions, he faced 
harsh criticism from one ideological bloc of the Court or the other. More 
importantly, however, they present the ideological divisions on the Court and 
demonstrate how, from the 2005 Supreme Court Term through the 2014 
Term, this placed a high-level of unilateral power in a single Justice. When 
the Supreme Court’s decisions come down to one Justice rather than to nine, 
the dispassionate judiciary envisioned by the Federalist Papers’ becomes 
much more susceptible to scrutiny. 
CONCLUSION 
The main goal of this Essay is to reframe the conversation and debate 
surrounding the current Supreme Court nomination stalemate. So much has 
already been said about the politics involved in the unprecedented delay in 
holding confirmation hearings.50 Like the Supreme Court’s current 
 
46 Id. at 396 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
47 For additional commentary on the implications stemming from the Citizens United decision, see, 
for example, Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 217 (2010). 
48 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008). 
49 Id. at 831 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
50 Compare Robin Bradley Kar & Jason Mazzone, The Garland Affair: What History and the 
Constitution Really Say About President Obama’s Powers to Appoint a Replacement for Justice Scalia, 
91 NYU L. REV. ONLINE 53 (2016) (reviewing the history of Supreme Court appointments and 
arguing that the Senate should not continue to delay confirmation hearings on Judge Garland), with 
Ilya Shapiro, Not Giving Merrick Garland a Hearing Is the Honest Thing to Do, CATO (March 22, 2016), 
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ideological divide, the current political rhetoric is ideologically divided with 
conservatives generally pushing to delay confirmation hearings and liberal 
Democrats generally seeking to press the Senate to hold them.51 
If the driving force behind whether or not to hold confirmation hearings 
is partisanship, it is detached from normative concerns. This central element 
driving the confirmation debate, however, is mainly unspoken. Instead of 
liberals highlighting that they hope to shift the Court back in the direction of 
the Warren Court and conservatives rallying behind an attempt to keep the 
ideological balance of the Court in a similar location to where it was with 
Justice Scalia, the discussion largely involves the merits of expediting or 
delaying confirmation hearings based on a historical understanding of the 
principles that guide such calendaring decisions. 
If the conversation is structured around the underlying issues involved, 
then we can begin to discuss the merits of an eight versus nine-member 
Court. Based on the history of the current Court, in either case, there will be 
a division of opinion between the Justices on many constitutional issues. This 
division splits the current Court evenly. This split quite likely led the Court 
to divide evenly in several contentious cases in the 2015 Term.52 
On the one hand, such results can be read as a cautionary tale. How can 
an eight-member Court that splits evenly across ideological lines fulfill the 
Court’s duty as arbiter of the Constitution? On the other hand, this situation 
might be instructive for the Justices and seen as a story of potential. A divided 
eight-member Court must learn to find common ground, as the Justices have 
done in reaching many decisions. A nine-member Court does not always 
reach fractured decisions, and even in cases where the Court is divided, the 
dividing lines are not always as predicted.53 Perhaps an eight-member Court 
would lead to a greater number of unpredicted voting patterns, with the 
Justices forced to compromise to avoid deadlock. 
In any event, given current statutory requirements, another Justice will 
eventually be added to the Court.54 With nine Justices required to be on the 
Court, the debate on when to hold confirmation hearings will inevitably 
continue to hinge on ideological considerations. From a rule of law 
 
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/not-giving-merrick-garland-hearing-honest-thing-do 
[https://perma.cc/HE6F-BEXE] (arguing that little good is served by holding confirmation hearings 
when the Senate would simply vote to reject Judge Garland’s nomination to the Supreme Court). 
51 Shapiro, supra note 50. 
52 See supra notes 26–31 and accompanying text. 
53 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (involving a majority 
opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan); see also Randy E. Barnett, The Disdain Campaign, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 1, 7-10 (2012) 
(arguing that threats of public disdain moved Chief Justice Roberts from opposing the Affordable 
Care Act to upholding it). 
54 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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perspective, however, we can only hope that the ninth Justice, whomever that 
may be, shifts the balance of power on the Court away from one Justice—as 
has been the case in recent years with Justice Kennedy. While some will 
disagree with the Court’s decisions, whatever they may be, removing the locus 
of power from one Justice will, at the very least, enhance the group debate 
and decisionmaking process that was inherent in the design of the Court as a 
multimember federal institution. 
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